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Has Laney failed to establish the district court abused its discretion by revoking 
probation and ordering executed his concurrent unified sentences of five years with two 
years fixed and seven years with three years fixed, imposed upon his convictions for 
unlawful possession of a firearm and two counts of felony possession of a controlled 
substance? 
1 Although Laney's Opening Brief of Appellant is bound, pursuant to I.AR. 35(h), the 
state's brief will be in "staple" format. 
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Laney Has Failed To Establish The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion 
In October 2009, the state charged Laney in Ada County Case No. CR-FE-2009-
19216 ("Case 19216") with unlawful possession of a firearm, two counts of felony 
possession of a controlled substance, one count of misdemeanor possession of a 
controlled substance, and possession of paraphernalia. (R., pp.11-13, 15-16, 37-39.) 
The following month, in November 2009, the state charged Laney in Ada County 
Case No. CR-FE-2009-21416 ("Case 21416") with felony possession of a controlled 
substance. (R., pp.228-229, 264-265.) 
Pursuant to a plea agreement resolving the charges in both cases, Laney pied 
guilty to one felony controlled substance charge and the unlawful possession of a 
firearm charge in Case 19216 (R., pp.61-67) and to the possession of a controlled 
substance charge in Case 21416 (R., pp.298-303); the court imposed concurrent unified 
five-year sentences with two years fixed in Case 19216 and a concurrent seven-year 
sentence with three years fixed in Case 21416, but retained jurisdiction in both cases 
(R., pp.72-74, 308-309). On December 3, 2010, at the conclusion of the retained 
jurisdiction review period, the court placed Laney on probation. (R., pp.83-85, 318-319.) 
Approximately 16 months later, the state filed a Motion for Probation Violation in 
Case 19216 alleging Laney violated his probation by (1) "[c]omitting the crime of 
trespass or ride on private property"; (2) "[c]omitting the crime of attempted 
strangulation"; (3) "[c]omitting the crime of domestic battery in the presence of a child"; 
(4) changing residence without permission; (5) failing to report for a urinalysis; (6) 
"[c]onsuming and/or possessing" alcohol; (7) using a controlled substance - "'spice' or 
'potpourri'"; (8) admitting to using methamphetamine on March 26, 2011; (9) testing 
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positive for methamphetamine on July 28, 2011; (10) testing positive for hydrocodone 
and hydromorphone on January 3, 2012, and not having a prescription for said 
substances; and (11) failing to pay fines and costs. (R., pp.107-1110 (capitalization 
altered).) The state also filed a Motion for Probation Violation in Case 21416, which 
included the same allegations as Case 19216 plus one additional allegation - that 
Laney failed to "reimburse Ada County for the services of the Public Defender's Office, 
as ordered by the Court." (R., pp.341-344.) Laney admitted five of the 11 violations in 
Case 19216 and Case 21416 (numbers 5, 7, 8, 9, and 11), and admitted the additional 
allegation in Case 21416; the state dismissed the remaining allegations in both cases. 
(R., pp.158, 390.) The court revoked Laney's probation and again retained jurisdiction 
after which it reinstated Laney on probation. (R., pp.160-162, 168-169, 392-393, 399-
400.) 
Less than five months later, the state filed its second Motion for Probation 
Violation. (R., pp.187-189, 416-417.) The state alleged Laney violated his probation by 
"commit[ing] the crime of indecent exposure." (R., pp.188, 417 (capitalization altered).) 
The crime was alleged to have occurred when Laney "expos[ed] his genitals to several 
female staff members at Easter Seals Good Will, as well as a number of other clients, 
up to 18 in one group." (R., p.190.) According to the police report attached to the 
Motion for Probation Violation, Laney exposed his genitals in the context of showing 
others a bruise he had on his leg. (R., pp.194-195.) Laney ultimately pied guilty to an 
amended charge of disturbing the peace, the state amended the probation violation 
allegation accordingly, and Laney admitted the violation. (R., pp.205, 434.) The court 
thereafter revoked Laney's probation in Case 19216 and Case 21416 and ordered his 
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sentences executed. (R., pp.207-208, 436-437.) Laney filed a Rule 35 motion in both 
cases, which the court denied. (R., pp.210, 439; Order Denying Motion for 
Reconsideration of Sentence (Case 19216) (augmentation); see Register of Actions, 
Case 21416.) Laney filed a timely notice of appeal from the order revoking probation in 
both cases and the cases have been consolidated on appeal (R., pp.212-213, 441-442; 
Order Consolidating Appeals, dated March 21, 2013.) 
Laney contends the district court abused its discretion by revoking his probation, 
claiming the court's decision was "based upon the unsupported factual finding that he 
committed multiple instances of indecent liberties." (Opening Brief of Appellant, p.6.) 
Laney also argues the court erred by denying his Rule 35 motion. (Id.) Both of Laney's 
arguments fail. 
The decision to revoke probation lies within the sound discretion of the district 
court. State v. Roy, 113 Idaho 388, 392, 744 P.2d, 116, 120 (Ct. App. 1987); State v. 
Drennen, 122 Idaho 1019, 842 P.2d 698 (Ct. App. 1992). When deciding whether to 
revoke probation, the district court must consider "whether the probation [was] achieving 
the goal of rehabilitation and [was] consistent with the protection of society." Drennen, 
122 Idaho at 1022, 842 P.2d at 701. The district court specifically found Laney's 
probation was not satisfying these criteria. (Tr., p.15, Ls.14-22, p.12-16.) This finding is 
supported by the record. 
Laney has committed numerous probation violations and has twice had the 
benefit of the retained jurisdiction program. He has also had the benefit of numerous 
treatment programs. (PSI, p.8.) The court was not required to ignore Laney's history 
following his last violation and continue Laney on probation. Laney's claim on appeal is 
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that, despite his history, the court should have continued him on probation because, he 
asserts, "there was not substantial evidence for the court to conclude that [he] had 
committed acts constituting indecent exposure" since he did not plead guilty to indecent 
exposure and denied "he committed acts constituting the offense." (Opening Brief of 
Appellant, p.5.) According to Laney, "[a] reasonable mind would not accept the 
unsworn double-hearsay allegations contained in [the police report prepared in relation 
to that charge] as sufficient proof of the serious allegations contained therein." (Id.) 
This argument lacks merit. It is irrelevant that Laney did not plead guilty to indecent 
exposure. That the charge was amended to disturbing the peace does not mean the 
factual allegations contained in the underlying police report were untrue or that the court 
could not consider them at the disposition hearing. Although Laney "denie[d]" the "most 
egregious conduct that was alleged," he acknowledged engaging in inappropriate 
behavior and that resolution of the case to a reduced charge of disturbing the peace 
"seemed like a reasonable outcome for both sides." (Tr., p.12, Ls.11-20.) More 
importantly, regardless of any denials by Laney, it was well within the court's discretion 
to consider the allegations in the police report in deciding whether to revoke Laney's 
probation. Indeed, the Idaho Rules of Evidence authorized the court to do so, I.RE. 
101 (e)(1 ). Thus, while Laney may think no "reasonable mind" would "accept the 
unsworn double-hearsay" in the police reports, the Idaho Supreme Court, by 
promulgating I.RE. 101 (e)(1 ), has indicated a reasonable mind may do just that. 
Beyond labeling the information "unsworn double-hearsay," Laney has provided no 
basis for concluding the information in the police report was unreliable or not worthy of 
belief. Indeed, the police report is consistent with Laney's version of events in that it 
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indicates, as Laney did at the disposition hearing, that he just wanted to show others the 
bruise on his leg when he pulled down his pants and exposed his genitals. (Compare 
R., pp.194-195 with Tr., p.14, L.23 - p.15, L.8.) Laney has failed to show the district 
court abused its discretion by considering the factual allegations in the police report that 
served as the basis for the probation violation when it decided to revoke probation and 
order his sentences executed. 
With respect to the denial of his Rule 35 motion, Laney asserts the court erred in 
denying the motion because it was "based upon the same unsupported finding of fact it 
relied upon in revoking probation." (Opening Brief of Appellant, p.6.) Laney's challenge 
to the denial of his Rule 35 motion fails for two reasons. 2 First, Laney presented no new 
or additional information in support of his Rule 35 motion. (R., pp.210, 439; Brief in 
Support of Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration of Sentence (augmentation).) 
Therefore, he cannot establish error in the denial of the motion. State v. Huffman, 144 
Idaho, 201, 203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007) (to prevail on appeal from the denial of a 
Rule 35 motion, defendant must "show that the sentence is excessive in light of new or 
additional information subsequently provided to the district court in support of the Rule 
35 motion"). 
Second, even if considered, Laney's claim that the denial was "based upon the 
same unsupported finding of fact it relied upon in revoking probation" is belied by the 
2 Laney filed a Rule 35 motion in both cases, which are included in the Clerk's Record. 
(R., pp.210, 439.) On appeal, Laney only moved to augment the record with the brief 
filed in support of the motion in Case 21416, the state's response filed in Case 19216, 
and the order denying the motion filed in Case 19216. However, the Register of Actions 
for Case 19216 and Case 21416 shows all pleadings were filed in both cases. Laney 
presumably challenges the denial of the motion in both cases although the record is 
incomplete in that regard. 
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court's order. In denying Laney's request for a reduced sentence, the court identified 
other factors including Laney's "significant criminal history" and his past probation 
violations. (Order Denying Motion for Reduction of Sentence, p.3 (augmentation).) 
Although Laney's act of exposing his genitals was "most concerning" to the court, there 
were clearly other reasons for the denial of his request for sentencing relief. Even if 
Laney's conduct was the only factor cited by the court, for the reasons already stated, 
Laney's claim that the court could not properly rely on the information is without merit. 
Laney's Rule 35 claim should not be considered, but even if considered, it fails. 
Laney has failed to show the district court abused its discretion by revoking 
probation or denying his Rule 35 motion. 
Conclusion 
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the district court's orders 
revoking Laney's probation. 
DATED this 23rd day of July, 2014. 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 23rd day of July 2014, l caused two true and 
correct copies of the foregoing RESPONDENT'S BRIEF to be placed in the United 
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